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 The manner in which the United States understands the background, motivations, and 
aspirations of the participants in the Arab Spring within the Maghreb Region will have 
significant implications for the development of future National Security Policy.   
 In an effort to better quantify this understanding, this work presents an analysis of the 
following three alternative scenarios: 1) The Arab Spring leads to internal conflict and 
Regime Change of Pro American Ally, which is detrimental to U.S. National Security 
Interests; 2) The Arab Spring leads to internal conflict and Regime Change of Anti-American 
regime, which produces a positive change in US National Security Interests; and 3) The Arab 
Spring leads to a protracted civil war and national dismemberment, which harms US National 
Security Interests in the region.  A thorough analysis of these three possibilities as led to a 
key realization. 
 The relative stability of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco is a definite positive aspect of the 
post-Arab Spring transition.  However, there is still significant instability in Libya as well as 
Al Qaeda in the Maghreb’s (AQIM) continued capability to operate from Mali and southern 
Algeria.  This will make the Maghreb region a potential flash point in Arab-Western 
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"On December 17, 2010, a policewoman confiscated the unlicensed vegetable cart of a 
twenty-six-year-old street vendor, Mohamed Bouasisi, in the small Tunisian city of Sidi 
Bouzid.  Humiliated by his abuse and exasperated by his Inability to get redress, Bouazizi 
went to a local government building, doused himself with gasoline, and lit himself on fire."1 
 
 Bouasisi’s act of defiance may have gone unnoticed by the rest of the world had it not 
been for the capability provided by globalization.  In much the same way as other somewhat 
isolated incidents have become world events, such as the pictures and videos from Iraq and 
Afghanistan depicting questionable actions or genocide tactics in the Balkans or Africa, 
Bouasisi’s actions garnered world attention.  Once broadcast his grievances and motivations 
were also publicized.  While only one man his actions galvanized a collective feeling across 
the Arab World which resulted in revolts and riots.  The impact of this on the United States 
and other nations remains to be seen.  This work examines the implications of the Arab 
Spring on the development of U.S. National Security Policy as it applies to the Maghreb 
region but also the effects these actions had toward the same end within the continental 
United States (CONUS).  This is extremely relevant as we go into a significant era of change 
across the Middle East, and the importance of this subject for America’s national security 
cannot be overstated.  Dr. Dan Schueftan, director of the National Security Studies Center at 
the University of Haifa, stated, “The Arab Spring has led to deep systemic changes -- mostly 
																																																								
1.  Gideon Rose. The New Arab Revolt; What Happened, What it Means, and What Comes Next. (New York: 




negative -- in the rules of the game throughout the Middle East.”2  Though this particular 
article dealt primarily with the Arab Spring’s effect on Israel, there are common threads 
associated with the United States, not the least of which is the fact that Israel remains our 
most trusted and staunchest ally in the Middle East.  Dr. Schueftan follows the above remark 
with one that capitalizes on this relationship between allies: “If this trend persists, it will 
harm the interests of not only the United States and Israel, but also Arab countries, 
particularly those that have been longstanding U.S. allies.”3  In addition, as Allen Keiswetter 
notes, “The Arab Spring has shown the limits of American power in the Middle East. No 
longer does the US have the prestige and resources to dominate Middle East affairs to the 
degree it has since the British withdrew from east of Suez in 1971.”4  This inability to 
positively influence the governmental organizations, and specifically those in Tunisia, Libya, 
and Algeria, will force the United States to place significant emphasis on the diplomatic, 
informational, and economic elements of national power as opposed to any substantive use of 
the military instrument to try to maintain diplomatic stability within, and good relationships 
with, these new governments. 
The Maghreb: A Brief Historical Overview 
 Understanding what effect these developments will have on the future of US National 
Security Policy is predicated on an understanding of the Maghreb as a whole.  “Maghrib,” 
(Arabic: “West”), also spelled Maghreb, is the region of North Africa bordering the 
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Mediterranean Sea.  The “Africa Minor” of the ancients, it at one time included Moorish 
Spain and now comprises essentially the Atlas Mountains and the coastal plains of Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.  The weather is characterized by prevailing westerly winds, 
which drop most of their moisture on the northern slopes of the Atlas Mountains and the 
coastal plain, leaving little for the southern slopes, which maintain desert scrub fading into 
true desert in the Sahara to the South.”5  The Maghreb region is located roughly 150 miles 
from Sicily and 9 miles from Spain at the Straits of Gibraltar.  This location has made it more 
prone than the traditional Muslim countries of the Middle East to European influence and 
colonization. 
The 19th Century 
 This period in the Maghreb region was characterized largely by European 
colonization.  Even with this colonization and the close proximity to Europe the Maghreb 
was technologically and economically well behind Europe in terms of economic 
development.  In large part as a result of this economic and technological lag, the entry of 
European influence into the Maghreb Region during this time “allowed cash strapped Middle 
Eastern governments to spend beyond their means…bankruptcy in the Ottoman Empire and 
its autonomous provinces in North Africa lowered barriers to more direct forms of European 
control.”6   
 By the end of the 19th Century, France controlled Tunisia and Italy controlled Libya.  
Even though Egypt was not officially part of the Maghreb, the fact that it was controlled by a 
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European power (the British took charge in 1882), had implications for European control 
across the Maghreb since it extended that dominance across all the countries that border the 
southern Mediterranean Sea.  Consequently, “before the outbreak of the First World War, the 
whole of North Africa had passed under direct European rule.”7  The Maghreb was, 
officially, part of the Ottoman Empire.  However, due to proximity and colonialist intentions, 
Europe provided military aid and other financial and industrial support to the region—but at 
a high price in terms of the loss of the local elites’ political control.  This was due, in large 
part, to the fact that the Maghreb Region represented the distant boundaries of the Ottoman 
Empire but was, for reasons of geography and economics, in Europe’s back yard.  One final 
issue regarding the Maghreb in the 19th Century was the fact that Morocco was the one 
country that never officially became a European colony.  The other three countries all fell to 
colonial rule early in the 19th Century, while Morocco avoided direct colonial control.  
Nonetheless, France and Spain signed an agreement to treat it as a protectorate: “[W]hen in 
1912 the French set up their protectorate covering most of the country, Morocco was 
divided…the north became a Spanish protectorate.”8  An additional note regarding the 
European expansion, though, is the fact that its catalyst centered on the French incursion into 
Algeria in the early 19th Century.  Had the French not been successful in their expansionist 
endeavors, European interests in the region may have been very different.  
The 20th Century 
 Many of the same European colonial ambitions that characterized the previous 
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century also marked the opening of the 20th Century in the Maghreb.  One of the key actions 
that directed how Europe viewed the Maghreb was the Ottoman Empire’s decision to side 
with the Central Powers during the First World War.  In making this decision, European 
assistance to the government in Constantinople stopped.  The Allies, collectively, 
“abandoned the policy of supporting the ‘sick man of Europe’ and began planning the 
partition of the empire.”9  At the conclusion of the First World War, the victors, with little 
regard for culture and historical precedent, re-drew the map of the modern Middle East. 
 Later in the 20th Century, we begin to see more evidence of political discontent within 
the Maghreb region but also across the greater Middle East.  Specific instances of this 
discontent included incidents of social revolt known as “Bread Riots”.  According to Anwar 
Alam, these bread riots were less about hunger and more about an impetus for political 
change: “[T]hese intifada amounted to protests against social inequality, corruption, 
nepotism, authoritarianism and the regime’s incompetence.”10  If nothing else, the riots in 
Morocco in 1981, Tunisia in 1984, and Algeria in 1988 served as precursors to the events of 
the Arab Spring.  Though not specifically mentioned in Alam’s article, Libya’s population 
had many of the same concerns as the people of other Maghreb countries in the mid 1980s—
concerns that would play a pivotal role in the eventual explosion of the Arab Spring. 
The Maghreb Today 
 With the actions of one man the fire was set for significant upheaval across the Arab 
world.  Though its affects were felt in Egypt, Syria, and other contemporary Arab locations 
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the Maghreb felt the sting of the Arab Spring across all four countries in one degree or 
another.  Beginning with Bouazizi’s actions and the initial civil actions it generated to the 
exile or removal of certain countries leaders the Arab Spring substantively changed the 
Maghreb regions political landscape. 
 Tunisia’s regime has collapsed and is being rebuilt with the first post-Arab Spring 
Election results finalized in November.   Based on official reporting within the country, and 
publicized by Aljazeera, the “The moderate Islamists of the Ennahda party have won 89 of 
the 217 seats…the once-banned movement will write the fledgling democracy's new 
constitution and appoint an interim government ahead of new elections tentatively scheduled 
for next year.”11 
  In Morocco, though it did not have a change in government per se, the actions of the 
Arab Spring did convince the King, Mohammad VI, to adjust the country’s constitution, 
giving much more power to the parliament.  This becomes critical when a closer examination 
of the recent elections is conducted: “The victory of an Islamist Party in Morocco's 
parliamentary elections appears to be one more sign that religious-based parties are 
benefiting the most from the new freedoms brought by the Arab Spring.”12   
 Algeria remains the one country not substantively affected by the Arab Spring, or it 
would seem so at the surface.  However, much of the emphasis regarding its upcoming 
elections is based on pushing the population to get out and vote.  In her article “After the 
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Arab Spring, is Algeria Next in Line for an Islamist Election Victory?” Isabella Mandraud 
brings out some serious implications to that end.  Specifically, she quotes the president of the 
Social Movement for Peace (MSP) who states, “If the elections are clean and transparent, the 
people will decide. We are ready, and – from what we’re hearing in the ranks -- very 
confident”13 This is important because the MSP is closely aligned with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, a group which, if it gains power in the region, may not represent the best 
interests of U.S. national security policy. 
 Finally, because of the Arab Spring, Libya endured a civil war and is now forming a 
new government.  How this government goes forward, specifically its relations with the 
United States and the West writ large, remains to be determined.  However, if the other 
countries in the Maghreb are any indication, the sweeping success of Islamist parties in 
Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria leaves little doubt that the same occurrence in Libya is not 
only possible but probable. 
Maghreb Governmental Organization 
 The underlying condition that shaped the Arab Spring across the Maghreb, and to a 
point across the Middle East, was a matter of governmental organization.  Three of the four 
countries (Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) had a very rigid single-party government in which the 
elite held the power.  Specifically Libya and Tunisia were dominated by very strong rulers 
(Gaddafi and Ben Ali), which secured their power through the promotion of family members, 
trusted associates, and a culture of corruption.  Ben Ali’s continued emphasis on the financial 
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interests of his wife’s family and Gaddafi’s widely acknowledged use of his son’s to control 
the countries security services are but two examples of this family based corruption.  This 
autocratic leadership characterized by a strong central figure, the identified corrupt culture, 
and long rule were pivotal catalysts to the rise of the Arab Spring in these two countries.  
Morocco, though a monarchy, exhibited the same traits with regard to the separation between 
the elite and common citizens.  To say the least, there was little opportunity for upward 
mobility of the lower classes.  At the very worst—a trend evident in all four countries—was 
a significant lack of human rights and human security.  In all four countries this manner of 
“leadership” eventually caused a conflagration sparked by Mohamed Bouasisi’s act of self-
immolation.  This created the catalyst for change and the events of the Arab Spring, which 
continue to reverberate to this day, and will do so into the future. However, Morocco remains 
an outlier as the only monarchy.  Its more decentralized governmental structure, though it 
doesn’t remove the gap between the population, may explain why it fared better than the 
other four during the Arab Spring.  Understanding the background, motivations, and 
aspirations of the Arab Spring’s supporters within the Maghreb Region will have a 









 As we completed our military actions in Iraq with the re-deployment of the last 
American military personnel in December of 2011 and have begun a significant reduction in 
forces in Afghanistan, the obvious question becomes,  “What is next?”  With the events of 
the Arab Spring, the next flash point could very likely be any number of areas within the 
Maghreb region.  That said there should be a very real concern for how the governments 
within those areas form and what direction they choose to follow. 
 The actions of the US military and NATO forces in support of various rebellions 
could potentially be a double-edged sword.  Those that benefitted from our collective support 
may see us as saviors because the chances of success without outside assistance would have 
been minimal.  Those same people may also realize, and to a point rightly so, that one of the 
driving forces behind our support was a philosophical disagreement with the government in 
power at the time.  Should the new government choose a similar path towards serious 
disagreement with the United States and other Western countries, even if for different 
reasons, they could be subject to the same fate.  In addition to these issues, there are clear 
concerns about Israel’s place within this new environment: “The Arab Spring has sparked 
Israeli apprehensions that the relatively stable region of the past several of decades has 
shifted against them. The Israeli government finds itself more isolated than ever.”14 
																																																								




 With the changing of the guard in Libya, as an example, the United States is in a 
somewhat precarious position.  Our government, along with several NATO countries, 
assisted the rebellion in an effort to provide the people of Libya with an opportunity to 
develop a government representative of the people of Libya as opposed to what was in power 
with Gaddafi.  The fact that this assistance could be seen as political as much as ideological 
is largely irrelevant.  Had we not assisted NATO in its assistance of Libya, the political 
backlash could have negatively impacted operations in Afghanistan and other locations.  
There is a US face on the Libyan rebellion and to a lesser degree on the Arab Spring writ 
large.  Consequently, what emerges from the Arab Spring across the Maghreb may end up 
being worse than what existed prior to the recent events.  To a point, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, 
and Morocco were seldom close allies with the United States or the West.  That being said, 
they represented governments we (the United States) knew and understood though did not 
trust.  Implicit in this new “arrangement” will be a concerted effort to approach the situation 
with open diplomatic arms in an effort to ensure the national security interests of the United 
States in this region. 
 The surprising speed with which the Arab Spring, or Arab Awakening as it is also 
known, traveled across the Maghreb Arab region and into the greater Middle East, based on 
both the overt and tacit support by the United States, will have significant effects in both the 
diplomatic and military arenas.  How the United States, and to a lesser degree NATO and the 
European Union, go forward with diplomatic and military relations with these countries will 
play a pivotal role in the stability of these emerging governments.  Of specific concern is the 




remains to be seen is whether the forces we supported will remain friendly to the United 
States and other Western governments, or if popular feeling within Libya will go the route of 
Shari’ a Law with its strict interpretation and guidance for relations with non-Muslim 
countries.  We can only hypothesize that the relationship will be tenuous at best as these 
groups vie for power. 
Background 
 The Maghreb has never been a particularly peaceful one.  Though this does not mean 
to imply that the countries within the region were always at war or engaged in conflict, the 
lack of peace and tranquility, primarily within their own borders, is at the heart of the 
problem.  In addition, looking at the problem from a security policy perspective, it is a region 
that has ebbed and flowed with regard to its relationship with the United States.  Libya, 
though it had softened its rhetoric in recent years, was the culprit behind the Pan Am Flight 
103 terrorist bombing.  The removal of Gaddafi has not removed that blight on Libya's 
record.  The other three countries of the Maghreb region tend to maintain decent relations 
with the United States, but their internal politics will be much more difficult to predict. 
 The issues that we have seen emerge as a result of the Arab Spring, and more 
importantly the issues that drove the various countries’ citizens to revolt, are not new or 
unique by any means.  The driving force behind this widespread revolt was a combination of 
a desire for change in treatment (specifically closing the gap between the common man and 
the elite) and a focus by some groups on a return to a more Muslim focused governmental 
structure.  Some of this discussion centers on a how the population understands the concept 




New Arab Revolt; What Happened, What it Means, and What Comes Next”, the very use of 
freedom and slavery, until recently, had a different connotation in the Arab world than it did 
in the West: “unlike in the Western World, ‘slavery’ and ‘freedom’ were not until recently 
used as metaphors for bad and good government.”15  The understanding of the citizens of all 
the countries impacted by the Arab Spring was one of repression and, in an Arab/Muslim 
understanding, a lack of justice resident within the government.  Some could say that the 
realization of this “lack of justice” is a result of globalization and the access that, up until 
recently, was restricted to very few people within these countries.  One point to be made, 
though, is that the restriction of perquisites to the elites was much less a function of the 
government in particular as it was a function of a lack of money with which to support this 
global connectivity, and thus the common peoples’ prosperity, at the local level.  The fact 
that the capability was or was not restricted by the government is also somewhat irrelevant.  
The citizens of a country look to their government, whether overtly or simply by assumption, 
to protect them and provide for their safety, security, and freedom to work.  When by their 
action or lack thereof this is proven inaccurate, the eventual result is either continued 
submission to the status quo because of a lack of will to fight or revolt, or a decision to 
revolt.  In this case the result was revolt across many countries.          
Methodology 
  
 The American people, for the most part, are idealistic.  The desire to see other 
nation’s populations afforded the same rights and privileges we enjoy can sometimes cloud 
the reality of the situation.  However, the version of democracy that emerges in the Maghreb, 
																																																								




specifically Libya, may not be what Americans have envisioned.  While there is a segment of 
the population that realizes this, there are those who are looking for a traditional US model of 
democracy.  In the end, as long as the government that develops is one that is recognized and 
desired by the people then it is “democratic” in its development. 
 In beginning the study of the Arab Spring, an important decision must be reached on 
how to approach the research.  It is this researcher’s intent to proceed from an exploratory 
standpoint.  The goal is to examine the historical significance of the Arab Spring in the 
context of past events of a similar nature; the significance of the current actions; and finally 
the impact these events have had and will have on US national security policy.  Some 
comparison between the social attitudes and actions of past event timelines to those that were 
in place in December of 2010 will be required in order to gain a more accurate understanding 
of the driving forces of the recent revolts.  In addition, as the research continues, the 
development of various governmental structures in Tunisia and Libya will also play a pivotal 
role in the research. 
 In order to develop a starting point from which to assess the effects of the Arab 
Spring, specifically in the Maghreb Region, three possible options present themselves:  
 1) The Arab Spring leads to internal conflict and regime change of an American ally, 
which is detrimental to US national security interests. 
 
 2) The Arab Spring leads to internal conflict and regime change of an Anti-American 
regime, which produces—or at least could produce—a positive change in US national 
security interests. 
 
 3) The Arab Spring leads to a protracted civil war and national dismemberment, 





 With these propositions as a starting point, and in an effort to better quantify the 
research, this essay provides some operational measures to gauge the effects of the Arab 
Spring in the Maghreb Region on US national security. The data for this research comes 
primarily from library and online research utilizing a mix of primary and secondary sources.  
Specific primary sources include information from organizations like the Abu Dhabi Gallup 
Center dealing with its study of Muslim West relations.  Specific secondary source examples 
would be historical perspectives of the Maghreb as it applies to Western national security 
interests.  Specific data that will be analyzed are illustrated below in the breakdown of the 
operational measures.  The final element of the methodology involves optimum analysis of 
the data.  We will use a mix of inferential statistics and narrative analysis.  The inferential 
statistics will be based on the various Gallup Polls and on those of other organizations like 
the UN and their development reports, as well as the various country indices available that 
track actions within the Arab world, again concentrating on the Maghreb region.  The 
narrative analysis comes from the case studies and literature published on the current state of 
the Maghreb as well as the historical context from which the Arab Spring developed.  The 
foundation of this research will be based on information and research provided by the Gallup 
Muslim-West Perception Index (December 2011), Foreign Affairs Failed State Index (2007-
2011), Gallup Center for Muslim Studies Reports, and country specific reports. 
Operational Indicators Defining National Security 
 
 For the purposes of this study U.S. national security interests are defined along the 
five goals posited below and on the following page. Each goal is further operationalized to 




Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and the current period. 
I.  Prevent Terrorist Sanctuary 
 Country rating on Failed State Index—the higher it is the more likely 
terrorist network will emerge 
 Country rating on Muslim-West perspectives index constructed by Gallup 
Muslim-West on Global Perceptions index—the more negative the 
country’s view of the West the more likely that terror groups will be 
offered sanctuary 
 Extremist versus Moderate attitudes in Country—the higher the level of 
extremism the more likely terror networks will be supported 
 Support for Al Qaeda—the higher the support the more likely the radical 
terror network will emerge 
II.  Keep Arab Allies of U.S. in Power 
 Country rating on Failed state index—the lower the country’s rating the 
more likely the regime will remain in power 
 Country rating on Muslim-West attitudes index—the more positive the 
country view of the West the more likely the regime will persist 
 Extremist versus Moderate attitudes in country—the more moderate the 
population the more likely the regime will remain in power 
 Support for Al Qaeda—the less support the group has in the country the 
more likely the regime will remain in power 
III.  Contain and Diminish Anti-American Regimes and Groups 
 Country rating on failed state index—the higher the rating the more likely 
anti-American extremist groups will emerge 
 Country rating on Muslim-West attitudes index—the more negative the 
country toward the West the less likely a containment strategy will be 
successful 
 High levels of support for extremism the more likely the U.S. will fail in 
containing these groups 
 More support for Al Qaeda in the country- the less likely the U.S. will 
succeed 
 
IV.  Achieve Energy and Resource Security 
 
 Country rating on failed state index—the higher the rating the more likely 




 Country rating on Muslim-West attitudes index—the more negative the 
country the less likely it is to allow Western access to energy 
 Oil production in country per barrel 
 Natural gas production rates 
 
V.  Insure Survival of Non-Arab Ally (Israel) in the Region 
 Abrogation of treaties with Israel by Arab States endangers the Jewish 
State 
 Country rating on failed state index—the higher the rating the more likely 
there will be antagonistic relations 
 Country rating on Muslim-West attitudes index—the more negative a 
country is toward the West the more likely it is to compromise Israeli 
security 
 Extremist versus Moderate attitudes—if extremism dominates a country’s 
public opinion, the threat to Israel increases 
 Support for Al Qaeda—the higher the level of support for Al Qaeda, the 
more likely the regime will be to threaten Israel’s existence 
 
 By operationalizing these five goals, we will use these indicators to gauge the effect 
of the Arab Spring on U.S. interests with Failed State Muslim-West relations index, 
providing a common base of comparison for each country studied. This analysis will be 
buttressed and supported by qualitative evidence for the countries examined. 
Definitions and Literature Review 
 Developing an understanding of the key definitions and literature available on the 
subject of the Maghreb Region and its impact, because of the Arab Spring, on US National 
Security policy is the key point for this research.  The first definition needed for an 
understanding of this subject is obviously "Maghreb," which is defined as "The westernmost 




Arabian Peninsula in the century after Mohammed's death."16  There is also the necessity to 
understand the term "Arab Nationalism" as it plays a pivotal role in the uprisings and riots 
within the Maghreb.  Arab Nationalism is defined as "the belief that Arabs constitute a single 
political community (or nation) and should have a common government."17  The driver 
behind this point is, and will remain, the fact that in the minds of this community there is no 
separation between the state and the religion.  In other words “this follows the concept of the 
Umma, the community of believers.”18  The concerns of this approach will be addressed over 
the course of this research.  The final key definition the reader must understand is the concept 
of the "Arab Spring".  This term is defined as "a series of anti-government uprisings in 
various countries in North Africa and the Middle East, beginning in Tunisia in December 
2010."19  These uprisings resulted in a significant change in the governmental landscape of 
the Maghreb region.  Understanding these definitions and concepts is a precursor to being 
able to understand the information presented in the various books, publications, and literary 
documents used to build the foundation for this research. 
 There is a wealth of information regarding the Maghreb region and the recent Arab 
Spring available both on line and in research libraries.  This work focuses on two areas in the 
literature review to quantify the key points of the research.  The first area was the Arab 
Spring writ large.  Books here discuss the history of the Maghreb region, North Africa as a 
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whole, and the colonization of the area by European countries.  The second area is a more in-
depth focus on the various countries that make up the Maghreb region.  Along that line is a 
discussion of their foreign policy approach to the United States and the governmental 
structures in place, specifically that of Algeria.    As discussed in the “History” section 
above, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya all experienced some level of governmental 
reorganization because of actions associated with the Arab Spring.  The literature available 








HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES OF THE MAGHREB REGION 
 
Algeria 
"The states of North Africa, as well as other Arab states and 
many other countries in the developing world generally, share a 
common predicament: public contestation and the right to 
participate - democracy's core principles - are virtually 
nonexistent or at least seriously compromised"20 
 French incursions into Algeria began in 1827 with a dispute over a 30-year-old debt.  
Two citizens brought this debt to the attention of the Dey (Governor) of Algeria.  In the 
course of discussions relative to the debt the French official conducting the negotiation for 
his government felt slighted by the Dey and, in accordance with upholding French honor, the 
French King, Louis XVIII, established a naval blockade to punish the Algerians for their 
insult.  Because the blockade did not garner the effect desired, the King ordered a more 
aggressive military response.  This response resulted in an invasion of Algeria, a long war of 
conquest, and over a century of French colonial rule.   
 French colonization lasted from 1830 through Algerian independence in 1962.  This 
132-year period was marked with periods of both peace and conflict as would be expected 
with any colony.  The main issue that drove discontent was the lack of equality afforded 
Algerian citizens when compared to French settlers.  Much like the restrictions placed on 
African-Americans prior to the civil rights movement, Algerian Muslims were restricted 
from leaving their home areas without permission, were not allowed to assemble in public, 
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and were not afforded the right to own weapons.  
 The nationalistic ideals that generated the fight for independence began in the early 
20th Century.  Three political groups drove this fight for independence at different times.  
The first was generally led by Ferhat Abbas and was composed of "moderates [that] always 
worked within the French system and did not become outright nationalists until after the war 
of national liberation."21  The second political organization was the North African Star 
(ENA), which formed, initially, in 1926 as a communist organization.  Algerians living in 
France established this organization.  It only became active in Algeria proper once it had 
become an established organization.  The ENA, led by Messali Hadj, evolved and developed 
over the course of time into the Algerian People's Party (PPA), which had been determined to 
be illegal by the Vichy government during World War II, but returned to the fore after the 
War as the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Societies (MTLD).  The final political 
group was the Association of Algerian Reformists Ulama.  This group was founded and led 
by Abd al Hamid Ben Badis and was begun in 1931.  All three of these groups played a 
pivotal role in the emergence of Algerian Nationalism and the eventual end of French 
colonial rule in Algeria. 
 Along with the overt and covert actions of the three nationalist groups, there were two 
key events that had a detrimental effect on French authority during the period of 
colonization.  The first was the defeat of the French, by the Germans, during World War II, 
and the subsequent liberation of the French by Allied forces.  The second major blow, which 
really lent itself to exposing the fact that the French were not the military power they 
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professed to be, was their defeat at Dien Bien Phu by the Viet Minh.  These two examples of 
a perceived weakness in both the French military and government opened the door for the 
more radical and unsanctioned actions of a splinter group of the PPA to spark the fires of 
national liberation.  This splinter group, the OS (Organisation Spéciale, or Secret 
Organization) was made up of the younger and more radical members of the ELN, who felt 
the leadership was not moving quickly enough.  This group maintained the focus on the 
insurgency by establishing the various bureaucratic organizations needed to keep the 
movement going.  These actions eventually led to formation of a new organization, the FLN 
(Front de Liberation Nationale) with its military arm, the ALN (Army of National 
Liberation).  It was the FLN that eventually developed the Provisional Government of the 
Algerian Republic (GPRA) as an answer to de Gaulle's giving Algerians the option to remain 
a part of France or become an independent state.  This "option" was, in a sense, too little too 
late.  A point made by Alistair Horne, regarding the loss of life during the fight for 
independence, was "despite all of this, the tragedy of the Algerian insurgency might have 
been averted had the French shown 'a little more magnanimity, [and] a little more trust, 
moderation and compassion…’"22 
 One of the key points that must be understood was the gravity of the situation, or 
more accurately, the death and destruction of the Algerian fight for independence (1954-
1962).  Along with the fact that there were over a million people killed during this eight-year 
conflict it also sewed the seeds of other issues.  The extremely brutal urban terror campaign 
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conducted against the French citizens of Algeria as well as the guerilla insurgency made for 
very harsh conditions across the country.  Added to this was an equally brutal government 
counter insurgency campaign.  In addition to the affects felt within Algeria proper the 
Algerian civil war was also instrumental in removal of France’s fourth republic and the 
ascension of De Gualle and the fifth Republic.  Over time De Gualle came to see Algeria as a 
waste and unsalvageable.  In an effort to make some headway politically he put up a 
referendum on inclusion or independence.  The referendum resulted in a failed coup attempt 
in 1961 as well as Algeria choosing independence. 
 With the conclusion of the fight for independence, and the formation of the GPRA, 
Algeria set about becoming an independent nation.  The National Council of the Algerian 
Republic (CNRA), established by the FLN, developed the Tripoli Program, which "called for 
land reform, the large-scale nationalization of industry and services, and a strong 
commitment to non-alignment and anti-colonialism in foreign relations."23  This action set 
the conditions for the single-party system within Algeria and laid a foundation for the 
discontent that would develop the seeds for the Algerian Civil War of 1992 to 1999.  In an 
effort to consolidate power, the GPRA attempted to remove the ALN Chief of Staff, Colonel 
Houari Boumediene, and in a sense remove much of the ALN's political standing.  
Boumediene, with Ben Bella (founder of the OS), Mohamed Khider (former member of the 
FLN) and Rabah Bitat, formed the Political Bureau to counter the GPRA that resulted in the 
announcement, on 25 September 1962, of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.  
"Ben Bella, Boumediene and Khider initially formed a triumvirate linking the leadership of 
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the three power bases - the army, the party, and the government, respectively."24  This 
triumvirate was short-lived based on Bella's ambitions and, though he was the first President 
from 1963-1965, he fell victim to a military coup that placed Boumedine as President from 
1965-1978.  Upon Boumedine's death Bitat, then President of the People's National 
Assembly became the fifth President of Algeria though in reality he was but the interim 
President.  Based on a compromise between the military and FLN, Chadli Bendjedid became 
the sixth President of Algeria.   
 The development and perpetuation of the single party state (FLN) in Algeria, with the 
election of Bendjedid, was simply another step toward a civil war.  Bendjedid, from the 
beginning, was contending with political protests from university students, an ever-
worsening economic situation characterized by high unemployment, as well as the increasing 
religious discontent with the government.  Though Bendjedid saw the economic issue as dire 
and attempted to address the problem by dismantling the state-controlled system in favor of 
private control, one of the emerging threats to his government was the Islamist movement.  
The catalyst for the realization of this threat culminated, in 1982, with the call for a removal 
of the National Charter and implementation of an Islamic Government.  Though not willing 
to give everything in to the Islamists, Bendjedid did allow the opening of an Islamic 
University, touted as the world's largest, in 1984 and a revision of family status law.  This 








 Bendjedid continued the rein of the FLN as the single party government through 
December of 1991.  Based on election victories by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which 
showed overwhelmingly negative attitudes toward the FLN and its policies of the preceding 
30 years, the longevity of the current regime was now in jeopardy.  Though the Army 
initially kept to the sidelines of the discussions and discontent, so as not to repeat the 
violence that erupted in 1988, it eventually did "intercede" on behalf of the government, 
instilling martial law and arresting many of the leaders of the FIS.  Eventually, elections were 
rescheduled in an attempt to maintain some semblance of democracy.  However, the results 
were anticipated to be the same and, fearing a loss of power, "the army generals staged a 
coup d' état, sacked Chadli from the presidency, and closed down the whole democratic 
experiment."26 
 Though this conflict is considered to have begun with the military coup d'état of 
Chadli Bendjedid, and the opening shots of rebellion in the early days after independence 
was gained from France, the initial spark came in October of 1988 with massive strikes and 
walk-outs in Algiers that spread to most major cities in Algeria.  Bendjedid made attempts to 
quell the protests and pacify the needs of the upset citizens and, to a point, had some success, 
or at least enough to get him re-elected in December of 1988.  However, the impetus for 
change was already clearly present and gaining momentum.   
 The Algerian Civil War of 1991-1998 showed shadows of the 1954-1962 civil war in 
its brutality.  While the numbers killed were not as high the brutal GIA campaign wiped out 
entire villages and significantly weakened the Islamist insurgency.  This loss of popular 
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support for the Islamists actions led to a further fracturing of the Islamist movement.  Algeria 
was able to quell this Islamist revolt through a two-tiered policy of repression of radical 
Islamists and an outreach program to moderate and repentant Islamists though amnesty 
programs and the legalization of mainstream Islamist parties.  However, the emergence of 
Preaching for Combat (GSPC) in Algeria and its association with Al Qaeda also provide 
examples of the pending instability, remaining a significant security threat in the Northeast 
Mountains and the Sahel. This security threat, the weakened economic state, and overall 
discontent with the government all set conditions for the actions of the Arab Spring. The 
result remained a tentative government victory with the current President, Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika, affiliated with the FLN, which is the party of the military.  As discussed by 
Isabella Mandraud in the earlier chapter, the concern continues to be the popularity of the 
Islamist movement.  If there is true democracy in the upcoming election, Algeria may, in 
fact, become the next Islamist Government in the Maghreb. 
Tunisia 
 
"Of all the Arab countries, Tunisia is probably the best 
positioned to transition to a functioning democracy, however 
flawed it may be…it would seem only fitting that the country 
that sparked the Arab Spring became its first real success."27 
 
 Tunisia represents the birthplace of the Arab Spring.  The actions of Mohamed 
Bouazizi on 17 December 2010 sparked the beginning of the "Jasmine Revolution"28  
(Tunisian Revolution).  This served, in turn, as the catalyst for a wave of revolts across the 
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Maghreb, and the greater Middle East, called the Arab Spring. 
 The French colonization of Algeria served as a starting point for designs on the 
greater North African region.  Though not initially overt with their intentions, the French 
made incremental inroads into Tunisia in the form of financial dependence.  In addition to the 
success, through the French consul, of the removal of the Tunisian Constitution (officially 
removed in 1864), “they convinced Tunisia’s ruler, Muhammed Bey, to create an 
International Financial Commission to control state expenditures…it decreased Tunisia’s 
financial independence and made it more reliant on other countries, particularly France."29 In 
an effort to appease France for its territorial and other losses to Germany during the Franco-
Prussian War, the German government accepted France's intention to occupy Tunisia without 
argument and, in 1884, Tunisia became a protectorate of France. 
 Tunisia’s colonization occurred through a combination of European power politics 
and French "slight of hand".  The establishment of the protectorate came in large part out of 
an agreement with the British that the French would not challenge their interest in Cyprus.  
However, the Italians still claimed to have some interest in Tunisia, which France summarily 
ended with a claimed response to Tunisian incursions into Algeria.  Seeing the force that was 
closing on Tunis, the Tunisian Bey (leader of Tunisia and member of the Husainid Dynasty) 
opted to make a deal with the French, which resulted in the Treaty of Bardo.  It guaranteed 
French protection of Tunisia but also prevented any expansionist plans the Bey might have. 
 Though French colonization brought significant monetary and status improvements to 
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Tunisia, it also shaped the conditions for the eventual revolts leading to Tunisian 
independence.  One of the key groups initiating this push for independence started out as the 
Young Tunisian Party.  Formed in 1908, "they were a small group, interested in efficiency 
rather than representative government…[convinced] that the Tunisian elite was capable of 
taking over a greater share of responsibility…"30 This party fractured due to a perceived lack 
of action in 1920 with the formation of the Destour (Constitution) Party.  This group made 
strides and had the support of the Tunisian leadership but, as with many movements for 
change, elements of the group were not satisfied with the speed of the change. 
 This new element was called the Neo-Destour Party.  Made up of younger members 
of the Destour Party, they claimed that "nationalism, to be effective against the French, had 
to break loose from its traditional power base among the urban elite and mobilize mass 
support."31  Because of the Neo-Destour Party’s more radical stance on independence, the 
French outlawed it soon after its formation and its leadership, including Habib Bourguiba, 
was imprisoned.  However, with the election in 1936 of Léon Blum and the Popular Front in 
France, the Neo-Destour Party’s power increased significantly.  In addition to Blum’s 
approach, which was much more liberal than that of his predecessors, he also released the 
leadership of the Neo-Destour Party and invited them to discuss their issues.  In making his 
case to the French government, Bourguiba "specified as priorities the termination of 
arrangements advantaging French citizens in Tunisia, such as 'official' colonization and the 
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'colonial third,' along with the installation of a constitutional government."32 Though the 
Popular Front's time in power was short-lived it provided significant opportunity for the Neo-
Destour Party to grow its numbers and spread its message, again, fueling the fire of 
independence from France. 
 This continued push for independence in the interwar period continued to make 
France nervous.  With the various actions that led to World War II and the French defeat in 
1940, many French questioned the "loyalty" of the Tunisian people.  In an effort to appease 
these fears members of the Tunisian government, which was itself in protectorate status and 
thus largely powerless, attempted to trade loyalty for increased rights for Tunisian citizens.  
With the French refusal to recognize these rights, and their arrest of leaders within the Neo-
Destour party being arrested, the latter organized a protest in Tunis on 9 April 1938.  Though 
the numbers of casualties vary depending on whether it is a French or Tunisian report, the 
fact remains that there was significant bloodshed.  The Neo-Destour broadcast the fact that 
the French perpetrated the violence on innocent protestors.  However, based on the memoirs 
of one of Bourguiba close allies, “Bourguiba told him just before the disturbances that to 
achieve the party's objectives 'it was necessary for blood to flow'."33 From this point through 
the beginning of World War II the Neo-Destour could gain little ground against the French or 
against the original Destour Party.  With the exception of warning those in power to be wary 
of alliances with either side given the impending war, the Neo-Destour Party remained 
somewhat silent. 
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 In the post-war period, Bourguiba realized that there was little chance of success for 
independence without significant support from within Tunisia and, somewhat more 
importantly, pressure from the international arena.  He and other leaders of the nationalist 
movement made in-roads to the newly organized League of Arab States, formed the Bureau 
d'Information du Neo-Destour and also joined Moroccan and Algerian nationalists in forming 
the Bureau du Maghreb Arabe (1947).  Unfortunately, none of this assisted substantively in 
ending French rule.  One of the main detractors from Maghreb independence collectively, of 
which Tunisia represented one piece, was the subject of the Jewish State and Palestine.  Next 
to the brewing conflict there, North Africa’s political problems were a distant second.  The 
next decade was marked by an increase in actions geared toward achieving independence 
from France but with little success until, "in June of 1954 a socialist premier, Pierre Mendes-
France, comes to power in Paris and introduces a new policy of partial French withdrawal 
from two of the nation's most troubled colonies, Tunisia and Indochina."34 
 Due in large part to the direction and policies of Pierre Mendes-France, in July of 
1957 the old governing body of the bey and the Husainid Dynasty were removed and a new 
government was formed.  Based on his leadership of the Neo-Destour, which had formed the 
new government in consultation with the bey, Bourguiba became the Head of State as well as 
the premier in Tunisia.  This set the conditions for the single party system (New 
Destour/Constitutional Democratic Assembly {RCD}) that ruled Tunisia from 1957 through 
2010. 
 There were, however, key elements developed over the course of Bourguida’s rule 
																																																								





that solidified this system.  The first, which was facilitated by a French attack of Algerian 
rebel forces based inside Tunisia, dealt with the new constitution.  The Constituent Assembly 
(Tunisia's legislative body) was responsible for drafting the constitution for the new Tunisian 
government.  The completion of this draft coincided with the French attacks, which 
interrupted the discussions of some of the key points, namely the discussion of executive and 
legislative powers.  When the crisis with the French attacks ended and the discussion 
resumed, "the most striking feature [of the new constitution] was the strong position 
accorded the president of the republic."35  
 The next major issue solidifying the single party system occurred in 1975.  Though 
there were questions regarding Bourguiba’s health, including many in the government 
thinking he was close to death upon his return from getting health care outside of Tunisia, he 
was elected in November of 1974 to his fourth term as President.  The following May, t "the 
National Assembly unanimously approved a constitutional amendment naming him president 
for life."36 
 The final issue that brings to light the single party system was the removal of 
Bourguiba in 1987 by his Prime Minister Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali.  Though Bourguiba had 
been designated "President for Life" by a constitutional amendment there were those in both 
Tunisian politics as well as citizens who expected open elections upon the death of 
Bouguiba.  When Prime Minister Ben Ali removed him, based on increasingly unpredictable 
actions as Head of State, and then stepped in as President, there was some level of shock 
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among many in Tunisia.  In true "dictatorial" fashion Ben Ali set about establishing himself 
and his supporters.  Many of the former president’s supporters, at the very least, were 
ostracized from political participation with the most vocal jailed.  In addition, Ben Ali made 
it known that there would be no "disentangling of the thoroughly interwoven lines between 
the state and party."37 This further solidified him and his party as the ruling regime in 
Tunisia, a regime that would last until January 2011. 
Morocco 
 
“Morocco’s resources and talents, many of them still 
unexploited, offer exciting possibilities for the future, and there 
is every reason to expect that this country, which was one of 
the first friends of the United States, will continue to be a 
steadfast one.”38 
 
 The Alawite Dynasty has dominated modern history in Morocco, beginning in the 
mid-15th Century with Mulay Rashid up to the present King Mohammed VI.  As the quote 
above suggests, Morocco’s relationship with the United States has been steady despite the 
turmoil that has occurred across the Maghreb over time.  To that end, Morocco was able to 
weather the actions of the Arab Spring much better than its fellow Maghreb countries 
through savvy political actions by the King, which provide more opportunity, from a political 
perspective, for religious groups and parties.  It remains to be seen, however, if the changes 
put in place will mitigate the economic disparity between the elite and common citizen, and 
thus the level of dissatisfaction amongst the populace.  
 The colonization of Morocco became a point of interest among Europeans at a similar 
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time as other nations in the Maghreb.  At any given time there were colonial aspirations by 
the Spanish and French, as well as a medium of control sought by the Turks based on a 
common culture and language.  For the most part the common subject and the elite of 
Morocco had little interest in European trade or politics.  Even the events that led to the 
colonization of Algeria by the French and the defeat, by the French, of a Moroccan army 
force, did little to affect the general population of Morocco.  In fact, it was “the war of 1859-
1860 between Spain and Morocco [that] has been seen by historians of the period as one of 
the watersheds of nineteenth-century Moroccan history.”39  This war gave the elites, 
specifically, the first real indication of the sub-standard condition of the Moroccan Army.  
This realization impacted significantly how they would approach future relationships outside 
their own borders.  Three key points of tension between the “potential” colonial powers and 
the Moroccan leadership grew out of this realization: “the status of protégés, commercial 
privileges, and frontier incidents between Moroccan tribesmen and French and Spanish 
troops.”40 In examining the “modus operandi” of many colonial powers, it is clear that they 
used some perceived threat, in this case Moroccan tribesmen, as a pretext for war and 
eventual colonization.  Given the disastrous results of the Moroccan-Spanish War, any 
confrontation with the French or Spanish was somewhat less than desirable.  Commercial 
privileges were another “inroad” used by colonial powers—privileges that the Moroccan 
government afforded to some, but not all, foreign merchants living and working in Morocco.  
The final point of tension was the protégés.  These were Moroccan nationals hired by foreign 
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merchants to provide them additional advantages with citizens outside the urban areas.  
Having a local face associated with the goods and services gave these merchants better 
opportunities to profit from trade across a broad spectrum of the populace.  To a point we 
continue to practice similar methods both militarily and diplomatically.  The protégés 
became their own “class” in between the local bourgeois and common citizens, making the 
political landscape even more convoluted. 
 The final adjudication on Morocco’s colonial status came as a result of a conference 
held in 1906 in Algeciras.  The conference was necessitated by the perception by France and 
Spain of German interest in Morocco.  At the conference, with the exception of Austria-
Hungary, all participants agreed to the independence of Morocco under the current Alawite 
Dynasty.  What was not stated, though clearly understood by all, was the significant 
influence France would have in any of Morocco’s dealings outside its own borders.  This 
represented the first step to an acceptance of de facto, if not de jure, French colonization.  
With the French playing such a pivotal role in the international status of Morocco, to include 
incursions by any other foreign power such as Germany’s in 1911, the result was an 
increased French military presence.  Though the incident in 1911 was settled peaceably it did 
bring to the Sultan the realization of the lack of power he actually had to protect his country.  
In 1912 the Sultan (Hafid) signed the Treaty of Fès, effectively making Morocco a French 
protectorate and ceding his country to French and Spanish colonial aspirations.  Though this 
almost immediately met with resistance, it was not until 1955 that positive steps were taken 
to solidify Moroccan independence and restore the pre-colonial monarchy. 




the idea of Moroccan independence.  Sultan Mohammed V, exiled in 1953 by the French, 
returned and successfully completed the negotiations with France for Moroccan 
independence, which was formalized in 1957.  It was also at this time that Mohammed V, 
who made it clear he was working to transform Morocco into a constitutional monarchy, 
changed his title from Sultan to King of Morocco.  Though the King made the claim of a 
constitutional monarchy, the actual constitution was postponed until 1962.  And though 
elections occurred, the King became the Prime Minister and appointed his son as the Deputy, 
again solidifying the monarchy’s control of the government. Unfortunately the King died in 
1961 and his son acceded to the throne.  Under King Hassan’s II rule, the first constitution 
was signed in 1963.  The King professed his support for a multi-party system of government 
but also worked to ensure his position was strengthened and the monarchy would endure.  
The protests resulting from the King’s poor human-rights record, and the economic disparity 
between the elite and common citizen, resulted in at least two assassination attempts one in 
1971 and another in 1972.  However, in both cases, the King survived and strengthened his 
position even further.  King Hassan II’s priority while in power was centered on land 
disputes with other countries of the Maghreb and North Africa in general as well as building 
relationships with the West, and the United States specifically.  Over the course of his forty-
year reign he became a steadfast ally of the United States in its dealings with other Middle 
East countries as well as a significant, though somewhat silent, partner in the Arab/Israeli 
problem.  Upon his death in 1999 his son King Mohammed VI succeeded him.  The new 
King inherited the same economic disparity problem the plagued his father, but the absolute 




or revolts.   
 King Mohammed VI, though, continued to be very harsh toward any Islamist group 
challenging his authority.  The Casablanca attacks, conducted by GSPC, were meant to affect 
Spanish and British interest in Morocco.  The resultant actions by King Mohammed VI were 
extremely harsh.  That said, with the actions of the Arab Spring, King Mohammed VI’s 
amendments to the constitution and more open dealings with opposition parties helped him to 
avoid the fate of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and Ben Ali in Tunisia.  While 
Morocco has had a reputation of putting down Islamists’ attempts to integrate into the 
government, there has been a more open approach, as of late, to be more inclusive.  It 
remains to be seen, as was discussed with Algeria, if the changes put in place will be 
enduring or simply placate the population for a period of time before the next incident of 
discontent.      
Libya 
“The history of Libya represents, even by Middle Eastern 
standards, an extraordinary odyssey: from Ottoman backwater 
to Italian colony, from conservative monarchy to revolutionary 
regime; from rags to riches; and from brinkmanship to a 
grudging and still unfolding statesmanship.”41 
 
 In the mid 19th and early 20th Century Libya saw a combination of Italian and Sanusi 
control across its countryside.  With the ongoing actions in both Algeria and Tunisia by the 
French and the British operations in Egypt, Italy began to build its case for the colonization 
of Libya.  “A rapprochement politique with France, promising an Italian hands-off policy 
with Tunisia in return for a French equivalent regarding Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fazzan, 
																																																								




removed one major obstacle.”42 This time period was also marked by an increase in the 
religious teachings and leadership of Muhammad ibn Ali as Sanusi, founder of the Sanusi 
religious order.   
 Italy saw a colonial opportunity in Libya, at the time of the French colonization of 
Tunisia and the British actions in Egypt, as the last opportunity to embark on an Italian 
colonial experience.  Many of the early actions were facilitated by secret agreements with 
France, which allowed the Italians to concentrate on Libya and other issues without a 
concern for France expanding east out of Tunisia.  This removal of the French from the 
colonization equation, however, did not mitigate the issues and problems resident within 
Libya as the Italians began their advance.   
 Initially, Italy claimed sovereignty over Libya based on the Treaty of Ouchy signed in 
October of 1912.  The problem with this claim was that it was ambiguous enough to allow 
the same impression of sovereignty to be held by the Ottomans.  In addition it was so poorly 
written that the loyalties to the Sultan were still recognized by all citizens.  The sum total of 
Italian control, though on paper representing the whole of Libya, was mere miles outside the 
major cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, Denra, and Tubruq.  The year 1913 marked the point at 
which Italian military forces began their conquest of Libya in earnest. 
 The three regions of Libya (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fazzan) required varied 
approaches from the Italian forces.  Tripolitania was less inclined to riots or fighting against 
the Italians due to a strong desire, by at least the elites of the region, to maintain their 






The terrain, for example, was much more difficult as opposed to Tripolitania’s wide-open 
spaces.  In addition there was a greater Sanusi presence in Cyrenaica that contributed to the 
resistance effort across Libya and Cyrenaica specifically.  However, because of the lack of a 
concerted resistance movement “it was almost by default that the struggle against the Italians, 
particularly in Cyrenaica, would be fought by a religious Islamic order that relied 
overwhelmingly on tribal support.”43  In examining the third region of Libya, Fazzan, there 
was the increased concern of French incursion into the area, despite the agreement between 
the two countries.  Italy was concerned enough about it that it diverted forces from fighting 
tribal resistance, causing a significant loss of control across all fronts.  The Italians were 
again relegated to controlling only the coastal cities of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica with the 
balance of the country controlled by tribal leaders and the Sanusi order.    
 Italian involvement on the Allied side during the First World War, and a consequent 
neglect of issues in Libya, prompted the first solid signs of a rise in Arab Nationalism in 
Libya.  Two of the key developments coming out of the First World Warwere the rising 
power of the Sanusi Order, and the competing claims to sovereignty over Libya granted Italy 
from the Pact of London in April of 1915.   
 The rising power of the Sanusi Order was a direct result of the Ottoman pressure on 
the Sanusi leadership to attack British forces.  The leader at the time, Ahmad al-Shariff, 
stepped down and handed the leadership responsibilities of the Sanusi Order to Sayyid Idris 
al-Sanusi, who was the grandson of the Order’s founder. Idris “opposed the campaign against 
the British.  He brought about a rapprochement with them, creating a tacit alliance that would 
																																																								




last for half a century.  This also gave the Sanusi Order de facto diplomatic status.”44  The 
result of this ability to conduct diplomatic negotiations on the part of citizens of Cyrenaica 
enabled the Akrama Agreement.  This agreement, between Italy and Cyrenaica and mediated 
by the British, gave the Sanusi Order control of the entire region with the exception of the 
coastal areas.   
 Though this agreement significantly increased the power of the people of Libya in 
Cyrenaica, it did relatively little for relations between the three regions of the country.  Idris 
ended up going into exile based on his lack of confidence in any negotiation with the Italians, 
an opinion that hardened with Mussolini’s accession to power.  With the departure of Idris 
and the continued decline of inter-regional cooperation, any legitimate resistance to Italian 
colonization efforts was relegated to the areas where the Sanusi still held some power over 
the tribal leaders. 
 The resistance got a needed jolt with the ascension of Sayyid Umar al-Mukhtar to the 
leadership of the Sanusi Order.  Sayyid Umar al-Mukhtar had supported Ahmad al-Shariff 
and spent time in exile with Idris.  In 1923 he returned from Cairo and “for nearly eight years 
he led bands of Bedouin guerrillas in an increasingly bitter and unequal war against fascist 
Italy.”45  This eight-year campaign against the Italian forces led to the forced re-location of 
Libyan citizens into concentration camps.  The estimated deaths as a result of these 
subjugation efforts by the Italian forces range between 250,000 to 300,000.  Though this 
number is an estimate of the time period from 1912 to 1943, the bulk of these deaths are 
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assumed to have occurred while the fascists were in control of Italy.  The conclusion of the 
Second World War brought with it significant discussions on the future of Libya.  The four 
powers (US, Britain, France, Soviet Union) agreed that Italy would have to relinquish any 
colonial power over Libya.  However, it wasn’t until 1951 that all the diplomatic squabbling 
was finalized and Libya became an independent country.  
 Based on the years of negotiation between the Four Powers, as well as input from the 
United Nations, Libya became independent in 1951.  However, “the United Kingdom of 
Libya was an accidental state: created by, and at the behest of, Great Power interests and 
agreed to by the local provinces who feared other alternatives.”46 The timing of this 
independence was right at the beginning of the Cold War.  Libya represented a strategic 
location along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea that the West could ill afford to have 
controlled by the Soviet Union.  
 The new monarchy of Libya was based on the Sanusi Order and its first king was 
Idris I (Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi), the grandson of the founder of the Sanusi Order.  This 
selection made sense based on Idris’ tireless work toward the cause of independence and his 
negotiation efforts with world powers for the same.  Upon ascension to the throne the federal 
monarchy designated the King as Chief of State, a post that included hereditary succession.  
In addition, the development of governmental organizations also ensured that significant 
power resided with the King, to include the fact that many senior posts within the 
government were in fact appointed by the King.  The key elements of Libya’s political 
progress centered on the fact that after the first election all political parties were outlawed, 
																																																								




which included the deportation of the National Congress Party leader.  Confusion continued 
between federal and provincial authority, with the emphasis on provincial loyalty the 
preferable of the two.  The final element that shaped the Libyan politics was the absence of a 
child as heir to the throne.  King Idris I initially appointed his brother to be next in line.  
However, his brother was sixty-three at the time of this decision and died prior to King Idris 
I.  The King then selected his nephew, Prince Hasan ar Rida, to be his heir. 
 The monarchy maintained a very pro-Western attitude.  Over the course of the first 
years, King Idris I signed military alliance agreements with both Great Britain and the United 
States.  These agreements gave the United States basing rights in Libya, which proved to be 
strategic locations in the context of the Cold War.  The agreements also provided bombing 
ranges in the arid areas of Libya where aircraft, based both in Libya and Europe, could 
conduct training.  The diplomatic ties did not end with the US and Britain as Libya also built 
strong relationships with France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. 
 The major boost in Libyan status, from an oil-producing nation standpoint, came in 
June of 1959.  Exxon (then called Esso) discovered major petroleum reserves in areas of 
Libya.  This discovery and subsequent development over the course of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s created significant wealth in some areas of the country but also significant 
decline, particularly in agriculture, in others.  Though this did not create any destabilization 
in the government, the seeds of discontent were being sown regarding the form of 
government Libyans thought best for their country.  Prime Minister Muhi ad Din Fakini, 
based on his determination that the current governmental process had become burdensome 




abolished the federal form of government, establishing in its place a unitary monarchical 
state with a dominant central government.”47  This move, with the support of the King, began 
to solidify the initial seeds of rebellion by further increasing the imbalance between the 
population and the leadership, and between the provinces and the central government. 
 These seeds of discontent bore fruit on 1 September 1969, when the Free Officers 
Movement conducted a coup d’état.  The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), a part of 
the Free Officers Movement represented by twelve members, declared the Libyan Arab 
Republic on the same day, stating “with the help of God, in the path of freedom, unity, and 
social justice, guaranteeing the right of equality to its citizens, and opening before them the 
doors of honorable work.”48  The promised move toward equality, though, was short-lived. 
 The RCC, governing body of the Libyan Arab Republic, outlawed the Sanusi Order.  
In addition all political parties were forbidden save the Arab Socialist Union.  Many of the 
former leaders of Libya, to include the Royal Family, were tried for treason and imprisoned.  
Those not in the country (many went into exile during the coup) were tried in absentia.  
Though professed to be a government with no single leader, Gaddafi’s charismatic approach 
to leadership quickly made him, in the eyes of the world, the dictator in Libya. 
 The United States was deeply concerned with Libyan actions in the response to its 
shrinking presence in the country.  To the United States it showed a deteriorating relationship 
with between Libya and the U.S. as well as the West in general.  An example of this is the 
national holiday that was designated on the same day that the US airbase in Libya was 
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returned to Libyan control.  In addition to this deteriorating relationship with the West, 
increased ties between Libya and the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc nations made 
matters worse.  The major emphasis behind the US and British backing the establishment of 
Libyan independence and support of the monarchy was the strategic advantage Libya 
provided in the United States’ Cold War politics, and that advantage had now become a 
liability. 
 Libya’s reputation with Western nations continued to decline during the 1970s and 
1980s.  Accusations of sponsoring terrorism were prevalent in the 1970s to such an extent 
that in 1977 the Defense Department added Libya to the list of enemies of the United States, 
followed in 1979 by the State Department’s addition of Libya to its list of state sponsors of 
terrorism.  Gaddafi’s emphasis on Arab Unity was also a highlight of the 1970s. 
 In the 1990s there was an attempt to oust Gaddafi by the Libyan Islamic Combat 
Group (LICG).  The government put down the attempt and increased its crackdown on 
Islamist groups countrywide, but specifically in the Eastern area of the country where the 
Islamists maintained a greater stronghold.  The theme of Islamist resurgence also played a 
part in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. 
 “Although all Arab governments endorsed the idea in principle, most observed that 
conditions were not right for putting it into practice or that unity would come only at the end 
of a long process of historical evolution…[Gaddafi believed] Arab unity was not an ideal but 
a realistic goal.”49  His continued push to unite the Arab nations included membership in the 
Federation of Arab Republics, which included Egypt and Syria.  The concept, while sound in 
																																																								




some respects for providing a unified front for Arab unity, quickly fell to the side due to 
disagreements between Libya and Egypt, and between Egypt and Syria.  Not the least of the 
obstacles to establishing a full union between the two countries was the difference in 
governmental structure.  Egypt was much more open and democratic than Libya as well as 
having a secular government and culture rather than an Islamist or theocratic one. 
 Relations between the US and Libya remained strained until Libya began to open the 
door to discussions on the prosecution of those responsible for the downing of Pan Am Flight 
104 over Lockerbie Scotland.  In 1998 Libya agreed that the two main defendants could be 
tried in a neutral country.  The next significant move in warming relations with the West 
came in December of 2003 when Gaddafi announced that he would no longer attempt to 
procure or produce Weapons of Mass Destruction, in large part a result of seeing what 
happened to Iraq.  Gaddafi continued to work with the United States in an effort to increase 
his standing in the international arena.  Though not an ally to the United States, he was no 
longer the threat he once posed.   
 Actions on the part of the Libyan government from 1998 through 2010 were executed 
in a veiled attempt at few restrictions on both its population, and in its attitude toward the 
world outside its borders.  Unfortunately, the regime’s reputation for human rights violations, 
the absolute authority of Gaddafi over all functions of the government and country, and the 
lack of trust within the population were the driving forces behind the Arab Spring outcome in 
Libya.  The absolute authority, and resultant lack of trust of the population, were conditions 
set by Gaddafi’s destruction of all major government organizations.  The ability to establish a 




of movement enjoyed by Islamists and AQIM elements that is a result of Gaddafi’s actions. 
The question now becomes one of determining what these Arab Spring experiences mean, 
individually and collectively, for US National Security Policy formation within the Maghreb 
region, specifically as it addresses Libya. 
 The Maghreb region has gone through significant changes over the course of its 
history.  Colonial rule by France and Italy, wars of independence in the mid-1950s across the 
region and sporadic civil unrest have shaped the recent Arab Spring uprisings across the Arab 
world but specifically within the borders of the Maghreb region.  The volatile nature of the 
Maghreb can be attributed to many things.  However, the incursion of AQIM in Algeria and 
northern Mali, the unchecked arms trade as a result of the collapse of the Libyan government, 
and the rise of Islamist power are pivotal aspects of this unrest.  These various contributory 
issues will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter, which deals with the range 







ISSUES BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 
 
“The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin 
America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central 
Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s has barely reached the Arab States.  
This freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most 
painful manifestations of lagging political development.”50 
 
 This chapter begins the analysis of past and current issues in the Maghreb region, the 
intent being to extrapolate explanations for why the Arab Spring occurred and to what extent 
the actions will impact the development of US National Security Policy in the future.  
Compiling the necessary data proved somewhat daunting in that there has been a significant 
amount of work written on the Arab Spring.  Even so, much of the analysis is still pending.  
As an example, the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index covers the period 1 January through 
31 December 2011.   
 In an effort to examine as much information as possible, this researcher used a variety 
of sources to quantify what effect the Arab Spring will have on the development of US 
National Security Policy.  The first source is the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index, 2011. 
“The Failed State Index is an annual ranking of 177 nations based on their levels of stability 
and pressures they face.”51  The next source was out of the Foreign Policy Research Institute 
and authored by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman.  Maddy-Weitzman penned “North Africa’s 
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Democratic Prospects,” which analyzes a host of questions relevant to North Africa’s 
potential for a democratic future.  In addition, information from The Economist, titled 
“Political Instability Index: Vulnerability to Social and Political Unrest,” provided 
information relevant to the political, social, and economic factors that give insight into the 
level of instability within a given state.  Information available on The Economist website also 
provided a 2010 view of unrest within the member states of the Arab League. 
 The Failed States Index provides insight into the conditions of the various countries 
across the Maghreb and their relative positions during the 2011 timeframe.  The one shortfall 
regarding the Maghreb is that, with the exception of Tunisia, many of the resultant actions 
associated with the Arab Spring fell outside of the latest index.  This information is valuable 
from the standpoint of understanding some of the underlying problems that were contributory 
to the eventual outcomes, by country, of the Arab Spring.   
 The framework for this discussion will be the same for all the countries studied.  The 
countries will be examined from the point of view of the five strategic objectives. The final 
chapter will assess the Maghreb writ large against the three scenarios, make specific 
observations, and provide recommendations regarding the future of the Maghreb’s specific 
countries.  The main sources for this data, in addition to those addressed above, are the 
Country Rating on Muslim-West Perspectives Index, extremist versus moderate attitudes in 
Country, and the level of Support for Al Qaeda in the particular country. 
Algeria 
 The Failed State Index places Algeria at number 81 out of the 177 countries 




the results of the Arab Spring.  The available data, though, do offer insights into how the 
various countries of the Maghreb are viewed.  In the case of Algeria, one of the key actions 
that caused it to move up the chart dealt with its actions against regional terrorist groups.   
 Algeria’s record on combating terrorist activities is in direct support of one of the 
strategic objectives being analyzed: “Prevent Terrorist Sanctuary”.  The country’s emphasis 
on combating terrorist groups within its borders is significant in that it places itself in a 
positive light with Western governments, especially the United States, as the fight against 
terrorism continues.  When we examine the second operational task, “Keep Arab Allies of 
U.S in Power,” Algeria represents a potential positive point for the United States.  Though 
the country was not immune from the effects of Arab Spring protests, as well as the 
emboldening of protestors after the resignation of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, the Algerian 
government remains intact.  In addition, from an informational perspective, the President has 
also announced the removal of emergency state policies in place since 1992.  What this 
means, from a strategic objectives perspective, is that the Pro-American Algerian 
government, for the moment, remains in power.  The concern is for how long.  Examining 
the metrics established in the Failed States Index, in particular information provided in the 
Muslim-West attitudes index, and then looking at how moderate or extreme the population is, 
or will be, provides key data points for consideration. “Algeria is caught between its fear of 
returning to chaos and violence if the army and regime loosen up its underlying 
socioeconomic difficulties that cry out for political and economic reform.”52  The metric for 
Algeria moving up on the Failed States Index (a positive move) was its combating of terrorist 
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a positive aspect of Algeria’s relationship with the United States as it shows an ability to 
contribute to global energy and resource issues as well as an imperative to maintain security 
within the country.   
 The available information regarding the Algerian record with regard to Israel is one 
of the few negatives in the analysis of Algeria.  “Algeria’s reluctance to mend fences with 
Israel was a consequence of several factors: Algeria’s colonial legacy; the Franco-Israeli 
collaboration during 1954-1962, when Algeria fought for its independence; and the 
ascendancy of militant Islamic parties in that country.”58 
 Algeria remains a question mark at best regarding its relationship to U.S. National 
Security interests.  How the new government implements changes, conducts elections, and 
provides transparency and inclusion will be tell tale signs of its willingness to be included in 
the community of nations.  Either way Algeria is one country in the strategic importance of 
the Maghreb region and will, therefore, play a role in how the United States approaches the 
region. 
Tunisia 
 The Failed State Index places Tunisia at 108 of 177 countries evaluated.  As 
discussed earlier, of the countries of the Maghreb, Tunisia was the only one that has 
information reflected in the current Failed States Index because there were Arab Spring 
actions occurring within the observation period.  The key action was Mohamed Bouazizi 
setting himself ablaze in protest of his treatment by a Tunis police officer.  However, the 
picture is more positive regarding the state’s efforts against terrorism. 
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 According to the Department of State, “The Government of Tunisia placed a high 
priority on countering terrorism, using tight border and internal security controls to deter the 
formation of terrorist groups and block any potential for terrorist actions; social programs to 
reduce the impact of high unemployment and help prevent radicalization; and prosecution to 
punish potential terrorists.”59 Reports from the American Embassy in Tunis support the fact 
that Tunisia is a player in the prevention of terrorism and terrorist sanctuaries.  What remains 
to be seen is how that will fare with the developing government that took over upon the exile 
of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.  For the moment, though, between the Failed States Index, 
Muslim-West Attitudes Index, and extremist versus moderate views it is somewhat apparent 
that Tunisia is fighting against terrorists using the country as a sanctuary.  One of the 
unknowns that will hopefully become evident in the coming months as the new government 
establishes its authority, will be the level of power of the Islamists have and how they will 
use it.  A positive sign hit the news in November of 2011: “Tunisia’s Islamist-led 
government will focus on democracy, human rights and a free-market economy in planned 
changes to the constitution, effectively leaving religion out of the text it will draw up.”60  
This discussion of terrorist sanctuary provides an excellent transition into the second 
operational task involving maintaining Arab allies.  The other contributory factor that must 
be understood is the Salafist rise with the new Islamist role in government.  While the 
Islamists have developed an approach that forms a coalition with the secular side of 
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of Non-Arab (Israel) Ally in the Region”.  Though considered a US ally, Tunisia has played a 
major role in the Israeli/Palestinian problem.  From 1982 through 1993 Tunisia was the home 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with its headquarters on the outskirts of 
Tunis.  Though the decision to allow the PLO to set up within the borders of Tunisia was 
made before Ben Ali removed his predecessor it nonetheless represents one of the areas in 
which the United States has criticized the government of Tunisia.  Even after the PLO’s 
departure from Tunisia, the relationship between Tunisia and the new Palestinian Authority 
remained one of friendship and alliance, again bringing into question the ability to support 
any initiative securing the survival of Israel. 
 How the new Tunisian government approaches the subject of the Israeli/Palestinian 
problem will be a telling sign as to how the U.S. will approach relations with the emerging 
government.  A heavy Islamist presence in government, if approached as discussed thus far, 
could be seen as a positive in that there is not a significant drive toward implementation of 
Shari’a Law as is the case with most Islamist groups.  This initiative opens the door for 
dialogue on the question of Israel and Palestine.  However, if the Islamist outliers like GSPC 
continue their actions, along with other AQIM fringe elements looking to establish strict 
Islamist ideology, the relationship between the United States and Tunisia will suffer as our 
national security policy will have to reflect, or account for, a tenuous relationship. 
Morocco 
 The Failed State Index places Morocco at number 87 of 177 countries evaluated.  
Morocco has started a positive trend relative to the 2009 and 2010 indexes in that in both of 




As was discussed earlier, though, the 2011 index as it applies to Morocco, does not account 
for many of the issues, actions, and ramifications of the Arab Spring. 
 Looking again at the five strategic objectives, Morocco’s record with terrorism, 
specifically terrorist sanctuary, is definitely a positive one.  As a UN report notes, “The 
Government of Morocco, and frequently the King himself, regularly and strongly condemned 
terrorist acts, wherever they occurred.”62  In addition to providing a physical presence in 
condemning terrorism in Morocco the King also initiated a program, in 2007, which focused 
on religious acceptance as a means of countering extremism.  This program, known as 
“proximity strategy,” directed “the rehabilitation of 3,180 mosques, the training of 33,000 
imams, and increasing the number of regional Ulama councils from 30 to 70 across 
Morocco.”63  It is actions such as these, by the King and his government, that will endear 
Morocco to the United States and maintain it as an Arab ally of the United States. 
 This alliance has in fact endured for centuries.  “It is this extensive network of 
relations – political and diplomatic, commercial and economic, military and security, and our 
common sense of purpose and commitment to economic reform and development that 
underscore the strength of the Moroccan-US relationship.”64 The relationship between the 
United States and Morocco goes back to Morocco being the first country to recognize U.S. 
Independence during the American Revolution.  It became more official in the 18th Century 
with the signing of “Moroccan and American Treaty of Friendship” in 1786.  Though 
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cubic meters less than Tunisia, which is number three in natural gas production.  Morocco’s 
lack of energy and resource security could pose a potential risk to its stability should imports 
be affected by protests either in Morocco or in the export countries supplying the necessary 
petroleum and natural gas. 
 Though official diplomatic relations between Israel and Morocco have never been 
established, Morocco remains one of the staunchest friends of Israel in the Arab region.  
These close ties are, to a point, a result of the close ties Morocco has maintained with the 
United States.  This connection plays at least a modest role in the maintenance of the survival 
of this non-Arab ally in the region. 
Libya 
 The Failed State Index places Libya at 111 of 177 countries evaluated.  Though the 
Failed States Index does not show data, information, and actions that have resulted from the 
Arab Spring, the all-out assault on the Gaddafi regime, and the eventual demise of the 
dictator and his regime, the data in hand give us some idea of the state’s position regarding 
the five operational objectives.  Examining the Failed States Indices from 2009, 2010, and 
2011, Libya has remained at 111.  One of the reasons identified for Libya remaining 
consistently at this level is its poor human rights record and its historical sponsorship of 
terrorism and terrorist sanctuaries.   
 Though it is perhaps in the process of doing so, the country has yet to make a 
successful transition to democracy.  With a significant number of militias still moving 
unhindered throughout the country, the chances of another Libyan civil war erupting before 




fueling this unrest, in addition to the “unchecked militias,” is the continued demand for 
autonomy, and to a point a desire for secession, on the part of those Libyans residing in the 
eastern part of the country.  Tribalism still has a significant place in Libyan the 
socioeconomic landscape.  What must be understood is the fact that it was predominantly an 
Eastern revolt against the West, with significant assistance from NATO airpower, that 
overthrew Gaddafi.  It is these Eastern tribes that are pushing for autonomy and the heavy 
Islamist flavor of their politics will continue to complicate the transition process.  Another 
concern, as it applies to Libya, is the Tuareg mercenaries who were part of Gaddafi’s army.  
They have returned to Mali and are generating instability there as well as aligning themselves 
with AQIM.  In fact, they played a major role in sparking the recent coup in Mali.  These 
mercenaries, and their alignment with AQIM, have also complicated the formation of a 
national army.  Without some form of security force to mitigate the actions of the Tuareg and 
their AQIM partners the likelihood of civil war continues.  In addition these tribal 
organizations in the East that were responsible for the overthrow of Gaddafi are also in the 
area of the most prevalent oil production areas of the country, again lending credence to the 
skepticism of a smooth transition to a democratically elected government and ally to the 
United States. 		
 According to John Davis;  
“Libya is another well-known terrorist sanctuary housing not only Arab 
terrorist groups, but was also home to many European, communist and other 
terrorist organizations from around the world…one of the interesting realities 
is that the Libyan sponsored terrorist organizations that maintained bases in 
the country dominated the headlines in the 1970s and early 1980s.”66   
																																																								





What changed this headline-grabbing reputation was President Reagan’s order to launch air 
strikes in response to the Libyan-sponsored bombing of a Berlin disco in 1986.  The recent 
events of the Arab Spring and the regime change that resulted from those actions, while 
holding forth the promise of a positive future, nonetheless make it very uncertain whether the 
new government will represent the democratic ideals for which the protesters fought, or 
whether it will even survive.   
 In line with the democratic ideals, which, in theory, are developing in Libya and its 
new government, the United States hopes to develop the new Libya into an Arab ally.  The 
international community will be monitoring the progress of the new government for signs of 
radicalism but, to a point, the method, form, and function of the government that leads Libya 
into the future must be one of its own choosing without interference from the West.  Despite 
the ruling body in Libya banning any parties with a religious affiliation, local Islamist parties 
are still fighting the decision.  An area of concern is that the most organized of these parties 
is the Muslim Brotherhood and, if the pending elections in Algeria and those held in Tunisia 
are any indication, the likelihood of an Islamist majority inside Libyan politics is a foregone 
conclusion.  Therefore, the likelihood of Libya becoming a reliable United States ally in the 
region, given that it was not one prior to the Arab Spring, is very low. 
 Based on the assumption that the Islamists will do well in the coming elections, 
should the Muslim Brotherhood or any other strong Islamist party prevail, there is a very real 
possibility that the tide could turn against Western or US relations.  There is little chance for 
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question than the relationship each country will have with the West.  In Libya’s case this 
remains to be seen as the new government forms. 
 An additional factor that will have an impact on that relationship is where the new 
government places its emphasis with regard to the Arab/Israeli issue.  We must disregard past 
reputations, at least to a point, if the emerging government is to have an honest chance to 
change its past views regarding Israel.  That said, the former regime, though never directly 
involved in combat with Israel, was a staunch supporter of the Palestinians and provided 
support through terrorist groups and training sites.  The new government, if it values a 
relationship with the United States, must at the very least not come down firmly against 
Israel.  Simply put,   Libya’s degree of support for Israel will be a telling sign of its desire for 
positive relations with the United States, marginal interaction, or outright enmity. 
 The information provided in the Failed States Index, principally from 2009-2011, 
outlines information across a host of metrics dealing with the four countries of the Maghreb.  
In addition, Index Mundi also provides detailed information on both crude oil and natural gas 
production, which was pulled from the United States Department of Energy.  From the 
perspective of these data, and those of other ancillary studies and polls, a succinct picture of 
the Maghreb’s stability, and the implications for US National Security concerns across the 
region (as associated with the five strategic objectives), emerges.  Of the four countries of the 
Maghreb, Libya remains the great unknown.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, Morocco 
represents the most secure regarding its impact on the development of US National Security 
Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring.  Algeria and Tunisia, while both stable for the 












RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 This discussion of the Maghreb region and its impact on the development of US 
National Security policy now comes down to the impact that these countries will have on the 
future of the Arab World and its relations with the West and specifically the United States. 
Chapter one set the foundation for this work by discussing the history of the Maghreb, and its 
individual countries, across the last few centuries.  This contextual discussion is pivotal to the 
research because it lends itself to how the various countries, and in turn the region, operate 
both locally and internationally.  Chapter two took the next step by examining the 
significance of this research, focusing on the potential implications of US support to the 
overall UN and NATO effort in Libya.  Chapter three outlines case studies of the various 
Maghreb countries.  Through this examination a foundation of each country’s history and 
mindset was established.  Chapter four outlines the key issues that led to the eruption of 
protests during the Arab Spring and the initial migration to a more holistic democratic 
mindset across the Maghreb.  Finally, this chapter brings the analyses in previous ones 
together in an attempt to provide potential issues for further consideration in the development 
of US National Security Policy in the region.  
 How the Maghreb countries develop, or continue to develop, in light of the results of 
the Arab Spring will provide insight into to how the United States approaches National 
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Maghreb Country Comparison 
 Comparing the countries of the Maghreb falls into two categories, as applicable to 
this research.  Category one is the condition and rankings of the various countries prior to the 
events of the Arab Spring. The Failed States Index uses “publicly available sources to 
analyze 177 countries and rate them on 12 indicators of pressure on the state”68.  Figure 669 
shows the relative rank and score of each of the countries of the Maghreb.  The important 
point here, in relation to the development of U.S. National Security policy, is the analysis of 
group grievance; uneven development; legitimacy of the state; and fractionalized elites.  
These four indicators lend themselves, specifically, to the stability of the country writ large.  
How the population sees the government (legitimacy of the state) can be tied to its 
understanding of the development of the country and the gap between the elites and the 
common citizens (uneven development and fractionalized elites) which leads to the issues the 
population either blames the government for or holds those in power responsible (group 
grievance).  While across all 12 indicators Algeria tends to be most stable followed by 
Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, when the four specific indicators are examined, Libya and 
Morocco are in a statistical tie at number 2, with 27.2 and 27.1 respectively, and Tunisia at 
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that it is one of the leading crude oil producers in the Maghreb.  Unfortunately, Algeria ranks 
in the 56th percentile on positive relations between the West and Muslim nations.  In relation 
to the Arab Spring, Algeria had the greatest time distance between the initial protests and 
final official change as a result of the protests.  Algeria also is ranked second and third in 
median age and school life expectancy.  The median age and the expectations for educational 
success lend themselves to long-term stability as well.  Another positive point, based on the 
four propositions, is that the research shows Algeria may represent one of the positive 
highlights across the Maghreb for a continued stable relationship with the United States.  
That said, the overall analysis shows Algeria is questionable regarding stability based on 
some of the activities of AQIM.  The camps and training that are located and occurring 
sporadically within the borders, and the kidnapping of Algerian officials by AQIM and 
surrogates, continue to be concerning from a stability standpoint as well as a human 
security/human rights standpoint.  
 Libya is ranked 111 of the 177 countries on the Failed States Index.  While that leads 
to questions of its long-range stability a positive aspect of the research is the fact that though 
the median age in Libya is young its school life expectancy is the highest of the Maghreb.  
An educated population has a greater capability to work on improving its situation than does 
a less educated population.  The transitional government, though still in its infancy, 
represents that capability to make long-lasting and stable changes in its government.  
Unfortunately, however, Libya still ranks in the 23rd percentile regarding its attitude on 
positive relations between Muslims and the West.  A final note of concern deals with the 




successes of Islamist parties across the Maghreb.  The concern with Libya is that they have 
yet to make the transition.  While elections are scheduled, the record of successful elections 
in the region is suspect.  Complicating the transition process is the number of militias 
roaming the country, to include mercenaries that were part of Gaddafi’s army.  A major 
concern with these rebel mercenaries is their access to weapons after Gaddafi’s fall.  If left 
uncontrolled, these weapons, and the mercenaries and/or Islamist groups that control them, 
will be a significant threat not only to the emerging government in Libya but also to the 
region’s governments as a whole.  There is also significant unrest in the eastern area of the 
country, whose residents are calling for secession.  All of these issues make Libya the most 
risky for future democratic government and continued relations with the United States. 
 Morocco was the least affected, governmentally, by the Arab Spring.  The 
constitutional monarchy remains in power, albeit with some significant concessions by 
Mohammed VI.  Morocco ranks 87th on the Failed States Index, placing it right behind 
Algeria as number two among the Maghreb countries.  What puts Morocco in danger is the 
fact that it is a consumer of crude oil, placing it on its own within the Maghreb as the only 
country with no crude oil production capability.  However, Morocco’s median age and 
school life expectancy provide some stability in that it is ranked third and fourth respectively.     
In addition to this they rank at the 58th percentile in having a positive outlook on Muslim 
West relations.  One of the remaining concerns is how Morocco lines up against the 
presented propositions.  In this vein it is a statistical wash as there was no protracted civil 
war, and the decisions of the government will be the telling signs as to the relationship it 




party now has within the government.  The actions of the Arab Spring had the least effect on 
the Moroccan government.  King Mohammed VI’s approach has allowed for a more 
transparent approach to government, though with the added concern, as addressed above, of 
an increased Islamist participation.  This increase in Islamist participation represents the first 
time an Islamist party has been the majority in Moroccan politics.  Though the transparency 
is a major indicator of a desire for a more democratic process, the resultant Islamist success 
remains a cause for concern.   
 Tunisia is ranked 108 out of 177 on the Failed States Index.  This places it third of the 
four Maghreb countries.  While Tunisia historically maintained a fairly large production rate 
of crude oil, it has steadily decreased over the past 10-15 years, being surpassed by both 
Algeria and Libya.  What speaks to its chances of continued stability is the median age and 
educational focus.  Tunisia is first in median age and second in school life expectancy.  
However, they are at the 75th percentile regarding their attitude toward positive Muslim-
Western relations.  It is too early to determine how stable the US/Tunisian relationship will 
be.  The area of concern is similar to the other countries in that there is a heavy Islamist 
influence in Tunisia that could contribute either way.  Of the four countries of the Maghreb, 
Tunisia is the most secular.  Tunisia’s recent elections, as in other countries, have shown a 
pronounced increase in Islamist party participation.  While the Islamist and secular parties 
are working well together, one of the major concerns remains the condition of the economy, 
which is worsening, and the rise of criminal activity.  Both of these issues may be fueled by 
Islamist elements displeased with the approach their Islamist party is taking by forming a 




 Across the Maghreb, the results of the Arab Spring have yet to be fully realized.  
With the continuing redeployment of American and NATO forces out of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the constant movement of Al Qaeda factions looking for refuge, and the 
continued rhetoric toward Israel from Iran, the Maghreb region will remain a potentially 
strategic position. Morocco represents the most stable government and one that may serve as 
a key ally in developing a positive influence in the region.  Libya, on the other hand, 
represents the area of greatest concern within the region based on its current transitional 
government.  Though it is on track, according to the current leadership, to conduct various 
elections, there is enough upheaval still occurring that a successful electoral process is 
questionable.  Tunisia and Algeria both hold hope, but the Islamist influence in Tunisia and 
AQIM’s activities in Algeria remain significant issues of concern as the United States 
continues to monitor the situation in the Maghreb.  This region of the globe, as stated earlier, 
will remain of strategic interest to the United States because of the effects it can levy on the 
Mediterranean’s commerce though the Straits of Gibraltar as well as the American military 
traffic—three Marine Expeditionary Units a year at the very least—that passes in proximity 
to the Maghreb region’s coastal areas. 
 While alluded to across this research, there are two items that warrant additional 
discussion: the Islamist influence on Western and US policy, and the concern of AQIM 
protection by Taureg rebels.  As the governments of the Maghreb adjust their policies to the 
desires of their populations or, as in Libya’s case, develop an entirely new government, the 
concerns of Islamists have become key policy and societal issues.  If they are to remain 




Western and US policymakers’ approach to the region.  For clarity, this discussion is divided 
between the European Union and the United States. 
 The European Union’s relationship with the Maghreb region goes all the way back to 
the colonial period, when France and Italy were key players.  That relationship has now 
grown to include the EU writ large based on the societal and economic ties Europe has with 
its neighbors in the Maghreb.  The emerging prominence of Islamist parties, beginning back 
in the early 1990s, is something Europe is looking to leverage in increasing the 
democratization foundation of the region that was instituted with the Arab Spring.  As two 
prominent scholars have noted, “One of the main aspects of the European Union’s (EU) new 
Neighbourhood Policy towards countries of the Maghreb is the strengthening of the process 
of democratisation.”73 What this will provide, from a political standpoint, for Europe, is the 
potential of a more stable region within Europe’s sphere of influence.  The major impact 
Islamists have on Europe, though, is of great concern: “Since the mid-90’s, however, these 
parties have tried to embrace Europe’s Muslim population in three ways: by presenting 
themselves as defenders of the rights of European Muslim minorities; conducting electoral 
campaigns towards nationals living in Europe during respective elections in Morocco and 
Algeria and, finally, engaging in an external-relations policy destined to the EU’s public 
authorities.”74 This becomes a concern, specifically, for countries like France that have had 
connections with the Maghreb for hundreds of years and have increasingly large Muslim 
populations within their borders.	
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 From the perspective of the United States, the emerging Islamist power provides both 
a threat and an opportunity.  As discussed by Yahia H. Zoubir, in The United States and 
Maghreb-Sahel Security, the United States has concerns in the Maghreb from both an energy 
and security standpoint:  “The first are linked to America’s energy needs, and focus on oil 
and gas… they also favour the development of a stronger regional entity… especially since 
competition has heightened with China’s recent gains in Africa”75 From a military or security 
perspective the area is of specific policy interest because of what it provides in the realm of 
eliminating AQIM and other rouge groups from establishing training and operational bases in 
the ungoverned or under-governed regions of the Maghreb.  Indeed, “These increased the 
need for new ways of managing issues related to security, Islamism, terrorism and, for a 
time, democratization.  Most area specialists agree that problems of terrorism, illegal 
migration and trafficking of all kinds are epiphenomena that cannot be understood in 
isolation from the roots that engender them.”76  In an effort to conclude this portion of the 
discussion, the main implications of an Islamist majority within the Maghreb really center on 
the desire for success.  If the current Islamist parties are to succeed, it will require a 
realization of the direction their base of power wants government to pursue and the 
realization that in order to be successful will require some compromise on the economic 
front.  In the end, if the democratization of the Maghreb is to be a success, it will require a 
delicate balance between religious importance and a more liberal economic approach to the 
West.  
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 This discussion on the impact of Islamists in the emerging governments of the 
Maghreb is directly related to the second point of expansion, which includes the 
coordination, activities, and limited success of AQIM in Mali.  While not a part of the 
Maghreb, Mali plays a strategic role in that it has, up to this point, provided safe haven for 
rebels and AQIM, and will clearly continue to do so in the wake of the recent coup.  The 
current military and government forces in Mali have been unable to quell the actions and 
operations of these groups to include the most recent attacks resulting in “the National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad” (MNLA), which seized Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, 
the three major cities of northern Mali that lie within the region the Tuareg rebel group refers 
to as ‘Azawad.’”77  An inability to control this region will have potential impacts on Algeria 
and the greater Maghreb region.  As the United States develops its policy toward the region it 
must consider the implications of countries outside the Maghreb, specifically Mali’s current 
instability, because of their impacts on the emerging democratic institutions and the view, by 
these extremist groups, of a heavy Western/US influence. 
Conclusion 
 There is significant change occurring across the Middle East and the Arab World 
driven by the events of the Arab Spring.  The Maghreb represents a strategic position within 
the Arab World and in the area of the Mediterranean Sea.  How the United States approaches 
these changes will be pivotal to maintaining diplomatic and physical access required to 
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leverage this strategic position.  The heavy Islamist influence that is being seen in Tunisia, 
Morocco, and Libya could be problematic as well.  Much of the Islamist rhetoric to date is 
counter to democratic ideals.  However, in at least one case, Tunisia, the Islamist party won a 
significant number of seats in government and has made a pledge not to enforce Shari’a Law.  
While this is a positive result of the Arab Spring in at least one country, it remains to be seen 
if the attitude will hold and what the reactions are from neighboring Maghreb countries.   
 The main unknown remains Libya.  In Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria there was 
limited upheaval in government.  Both Algeria and Morocco maintained their governments 
through the conflict and Tunisia, though Ben Ali went into exile, still had a relatively smooth 
transition.  Libya is a concern for three reasons.  First, there was a protracted conflict 
resulting in the removal of Gaddafi and his subsequent assassination; second, there was 
significant outside assistance to the rebels from NATO, with the US providing air and 
intelligence assets; and finally, while there are positive steps underway, such as the 
registration of voters for the upcoming National Congress elections, there is still a great deal 
of uncertainty surrounding Libyan politics and government.  The relative stability of Algeria, 
Tunisia and Morocco are definite positive aspects of the post Arab Spring transition.  
However, the instability that exists in Libya, combined with AQIM’s continued capability to 
operate from Mali and southern Algeria, make the Maghreb region a potential flash point in 
Arab/West relations.  It also makes the Maghreb region of strategic interest to the United 
States.   
 Some key points, in conclusion, deal with what the demographics of the region tell us 




between 24 and 26 years of age.  Tunisia is slightly higher at approximately 28.  This is the 
primary age range of those that were the key players in the Arab Spring.  Compounding the 
problem of the Maghreb and its relation with the United States is the relative decline in 
global status of the West and the U.S. specifically.  While there was significant assistance 
provided to rebel forces in Libya it does not counter the substantive increase in prominence 
across the region of the Islamists.  The traditional anti-western ideology of Islamist based 
parties and groups remain the legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood from its 1928 fight against 
British colonial rule.  The Muslim Brotherhood, through proxy groups, has maintained a 
foothold in Maghreb politics and, for the most part (Tunisian being a potential exception) has 
maintained a rejection of secular law as it gives the perception of destroying Islam.  As the 
United States goes forward in its diplomatic support of the Maghreb countries during their 
period of transition it will be imperative that the dialogue on Islamist parties, Israel, and 
secular law be continued.  It is only through understanding the background, motivations, and 
aspirations of the countries of the Maghreb region that the United States stands a chance at 
developing a relevant and coherent National Security Policy applicable to the operational and 
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